Military Intervention: The Mythology of Intervention

        In any situation concerning the military, there will be some myths and misconceptions, especially between the media and the general public. Unfortunately, these myths lead to misunderstandings of current problems and a U.S. foreign policy that is more focused on intervention.

        In this article, Micah Zenko  goes over a few basic myths about foreign policy, starting with  the combination of NATO air power and a Kosovo Liberation Army. It is perceived that this artfully played combination is what caused Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to leave Kosovo in 1999. With this belief, advocates for intervention in Libya, use this as an example, which would have been fine if it were in fact truthful. A United States Air Force review told that 14 tanks were destroyed, not 120, 18 armored personnel carriers not 220, and 30 mobile artillery pieces not 450, were destroyed. Less then truthful information provided good example as to why we should intervene in Libya. It is misleading when officials are using the wrong information to support intervention initiatives. It was NATO's increase of air strike against the disciplined Serbian military combined with Russian's withdrawal that caused Milosevic to leave.

         Another very popular misconception is that no fly zones inherently protect the civilian population on the ground. But, of course, this is not always the case. This is proven in the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Northern Iraq situations where civilians were most definitely not protected.  The no fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not enforced very strongly, and even some Croatian and Bosnian Muslim planes and helicopters got through the "no fly zone".  Say the no fly zone was strong enforced, it did not stand a chance to the  strong counterinsurgency controlled by Serbian ground forces that massacred 9,000 unarmed Bosnian Muslims. A similarity was seen in southern Iraq, Saddam Hussein's ground forces waged an intense counterinsurgency against anyone that opposed his regime destroying historical ecosystems and building roadways in order to bring artillery within the range of Shia insurgents. By August 1996, even with a fully operation no fly zone, the regime took down a Kurdish uprising with 40,00 troops with hundred of tanks and pieces of artillery. One United States commander sums up the failure of no fly zones to protect civilians perfectly. "We would fly over the Kurds in F-16s to protect the population and assure humanitarian supplies. Then the Turks would bomb the Kurds with F-16s." A no fly zone is a great idea, and  even when it is enforced, groups such as the Turks aren't exactly playing by the rules, if they can attack ground forces, they will regardless of a no fly zone.

             Foreign policy makers and government officials often call on history to help make decisions pertaining to current situations, such as whether or not and how to intervene in Libya. But more often then not, the examples being used to back their opinions are often based off of inaccurate and misconstrued facts, and incorrectly applied the the civil war enveloping Libya. It has been proven that even with military intvention, there is always a messy follow-up that is too large for one country to focus on. Help from the international community, whether it be through means of force, time, attention, or resources  is almost always necessary, and I'm not sure the international community is ready to commit all of this effort.